Herm Hughes & Sons, INC v. Quintek : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1990
Herm Hughes & Sons, INC v. Quintek : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Clark B. Fetzer; Howell, Fetzer & Hendrickson; Attorneys for Appellant.
D. David Lambert; Danielle M. Ferron; Howard, Lewis & Petersen; Attorneys for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Herm Hughes v. Quintek, No. 900529 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/2940
BRIEF 
UTAH 
DOCUMPr*-
K F U 
5( IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
HERM HUGHES & SONS, INC., 
Plaintiff-
Appellant, 
vs. 
QUINTEK, a Utah corporation, 
Defendant-
Appellee, 
Docket No. 900529-CA 
Oral Argument 
Priority No. 16 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
ON APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, 
UTAH COUNTY, OREM DEPARTMENT 
HONORABLE ROBERT J. SUMSION 
Circuit Judge 
Clark B. Fetzer 
HOWELL, FETZER & HENDRICKSON 
700 Walker Center 
175 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
ATTORNEYS FOR Appellant 
D. David Lambert and 
Danielle M. Ferron, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
ATTORNEYS FOR Appellee 
i 
SuresE fejanra IstuiU 
v»£ 9 i991 
OOL7J Oi ; APPEALS 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
HERM HUGHES & SONS, INC., 
Plaintiff-
Appellant, 
vs. 
QUINTEK, a Utah corporation, 
Defendant-
Appellee, 
Docket No. 900529-CA 
Oral Argument 
Priority No. 16 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
ON APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, 
UTAH COUNTY, OREM DEPARTMENT 
HONORABLE ROBERT J. SUMSION 
Circuit Judge 
D. David Lambert and 
Danielle M. Ferron, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
ATTORNEYS FOR Appellee 
Clark B. Fetzer 
HOWELL, FETZER & HENDRICKSON 
700 Walker Center 
175 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
ATTORNEYS FOR Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
JURISDICTION 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
I 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF CASE 3 
A. Nature of the Case 3 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. . . . 3 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 4 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 8 
ARGUMENT 10 
POINT I 
HERM HUGHES FAILED TO ARGUE THE PROVISIONS OF 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-2-207 IN THE LOWER COURT 
AND FAILED TO ARGUE WAIVER AND CANNOT NOW 
RAISE THESE ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL 10 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THERE 
WAS NO AGREEMENT FORMED BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION SHOULD BE AFFIRMED 
BECAUSE IT IS SUSTAINABLE UNDER THE APPLICABLE 
PROVISIONS OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 12 
A. The courts' findings should be affirmed where 
they are sustainable under any proper legal 
ground apparent from the record 12 
B. Herm Hughes has not shown that the lower court 
applied an erroneous standard of law on the 
issue of contract formation 15 
i 
C. The courts' finding that no agreement was 
formed is sustainable under the Uniform 
Commercial Code 16 
1. The lower courts' finding that no agree-
ment was formed is sustainable under Utah 
Code Ann. S 70A-2-204 16 
2. The alleged contract in the present case 
is not enforceable because it does not 
meet the reguirements of the statute of 
frauds applicable to the sale of goods 
under the Uniform Commercial Code, . . . 20 
3. The lower court's finding concerning bid 
shopping by Herm Hughes justifies a 
conclusion that Quintek's original offer 
was rejected and that Herm Hughes's 
"Supplier Agreement" was a new offer which 
was rejected by Ouintek 23 
POINT III 
THE COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE SUPPLIER 
AGREEMENT WAS UNTIMELY AS AN ACCEPTANCE 
BECAUSE IT CAME AFTER THE 10-DAY ACCEPTANCE 
PERIOD IN QUINTEK'S "COST ESTIMATE" 23 
POINT IV 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE 
CONDUCT OF THE PARTIES DID NOT FORM AN AGREE-
MENT 28 
POINT V 
PUBLIC POLICY WOULD DISCOURAGE THE COURT FROM 
FINDING THAT A CONTRACT HAD BEEN FORMED BE-
TWEEN THE PARTIES UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF 
THE PRESENT CASE 30 
POINT VI 
QUINTEK IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS FEES PURSUANT 
TO RULE 3 3(a), UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PRO-
CEDURE 3 3 
CONCLUSION 33 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases Cited; 
B.R. Woodward Marketing. Inc. v. Collins Food Service. Inc.. 
754 P. 2d 99 (Utah App. 1988) 25 
Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth. 664 P.2d 455 (Utah 1983) . . . . 18 
Boese-Hilburn Co. v. Dean Machinery Co.. 616 S.W. 2d 520 (Mo. 
App. 1981) 27 
Branch v. Western Petroleum. Inc.. 657 P.2d 267 (Utah 1982) . 13 
Brigham v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n.. 470 P.2d 393 (Utah 1970) . 28 
Chicopee Concrete Service. Inc. v. Hart Engineering Co.. 479 
N.E. 2d 748 (Mass. App. 1985) 27 
COX V. COX. 292 Ala. 106, 289 So. 2d 609 (1974) 22 
Duval & Co. v. Malcom. 233 Ga. 784, 214 S.E.2d 356 (1975) . . 19 
Edwards v. Iron County. 531 P.2d 476 (Utah 1975) 12 
Ellis v. Robbett Manufacturing Co.. 328 F. Supp. 1377 (N.D. 
Ga.), aff'd. 445 F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1970.) 22 
Fossell v. Department of Commerce. 165 Utah Adv. Rep. 2 3 (Ct. 
Ap. 1991) 2 
Franklin Financial v. New Empire Develop. Co.. 659 P.2d 1040 
(Utah 1983) 1, 12 
General Glass Corp. v. Mast Construction Co. . 766 P.2d 429 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) 13, 14 
Gilbert & Bennett Mfg. Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.. 44 5 
F. Supp. 537 (1977) 23 
Goodsell v. Department of Business Regulation. 523 P.2d 1230 
(Utah 1974) 12, 13 
J. Baranello & Sons v. Hausmann Industries. Inc.. 571 F. Supp. 
333 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) 27, 28 
Jurek v. Thompson. 308 Minn. 191, 241 N.W. 2d 788 (1976) . . 22 
Marlene Industries Corp. v. Carnac Textilesf Inc., 408 
N.Y.S.2d 410, 380 N.E.2d 239 (1978) 19 
Mascaro v. Davis. 741 P.2d 938 (Utah 1987) 1, 11 
iii 
Maughn v. Maughn. 770 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) . . . . 2, 33 
Nations Enterprises, Inc. v. Process Equipment Co.. 40 Colo. 
App. 390, 579 P.2d 655 (1970) 22 
Porco v. Porco. 752 P.2d 365 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 2, 33 
Rees v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 808 P.2d 1069 (Utah 
1991) 2, 14 
Rockland Industries. Inc. v. Frank Kasmir Associates, 470 F. 
Supp. 1176 (N.D. Tex. 1979) 22 
Sampson v. Richins. 770 P.2d 998 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) . . . . 14 
State v. Walker. 743 P. 2d 191 (Utah 1987) 14 
Swisher v. Clark. 209 P.2d 880 (Okla. 1949) 24, 25 
U.S. Industries. Inc. v. Semco Mfg.. Inc.. 562 F.2d 1061 
(1979) 19 
W. H. Barber Co. v. MacNamera-Vivant Contracting Co. . 293 
N.W.2d 351 (Minn. 1979) 22 
Western Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson 
Cattle Co. . 744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987) 2 
Statutes and Rules Cited: 
Uniform Commercial Code § 1-103 23 
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-201(2) 22 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-201 (1990) 2, 20, 21 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-204 (1990) 3, 16, 17, 28 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-205 (1990) 3, 17 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-206 (1990) 3 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-207 (1990) . . 1-3, 8, 10, 17, 19, 20, 33 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (d) (Supp. 1990) 1 
Utah R. App. P. 33(a) 33 
iv 
Other Authorities Cited: 
2 R. Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code § 2-206 (3rd Ed. 
1982) 23 
5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 1461(1) 13 
67 Am. Jur. 2d Sales § 85 23 
R. Duesenberg & L. King, Uniform Commercial Code Service § 
3.05 (1977) 19 
Uniform Commercial Code § 1-102, comment 2 18 
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-207, comments 19 
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2585 
(1971) 14 
v 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
HERM HUGHES & SONS, INC., 
Plaintiff- : Docket No, 900529-CA 
Appellant, 
vs. 
: Oral Argument 
QUINTEK, a Utah corporation, Priority No. 16 
Defendant-
Appellee, : 
JURISDICTION 
The judgment appealed was a final judgment of the Fourth 
Circuit Court for Utah County, Orem Department, dated January 3, 
1991. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(d) (Supp. 1990). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the appellant waive the right to raise the issues 
concerning formation of a contract under the provisions of Utah 
Code Ann. § 70A-2-207 (1990), by conceding in the lower court that 
it was not suing on a written agreement and by limiting its 
argument in the lower court to issues relating to partial per-
formance? This issue was not raised in the lower court and no 
standard of review is applicable. Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938, 
945 (Utah 1987) ; Franklin Financial v. New Empire Develop. Co., 659 
P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah 1983). 
2. Has the appellant failed to marshal the evidence and 
demonstrate that there is insufficient evidence to sustain the 
lower court's finding that appellee did not waive the ten-day time 
limit for acceptance of its "Cost Estimate?" The standard of 
review is whether there is competent evidence to sustain the lower 
court's findings. Rees v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 808 
P.2d 1069 (Utah 1991). 
3. Does the Uniform Commercial Code in any way restrict the 
right of a contracting party to specifically limit the time within 
which acceptance of an offer must occur? This issue is subject to 
review for correctness. Western Kane County Special Serv. Dist. 
No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987). 
4. Does Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-207 (199 0) apply where a 
contract has not been admitted? This issue is subject to review 
for correctness. Western Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. 
Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987). 
5. Where the lower court made no findings concerning breach 
of a contract or damages because no contract was found to exist, 
should the case be referred back to the trial court in the event 
the appellate court finds that a contract was formed? Fossell v. 
Department of Commerce, 165 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 26 (Ct. Ap. 1991). 
6. Is the appellee entitled to an award of costs and fees 
pursuant to Rule 33(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure? 
Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Maughn v. 
Mauqhn, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The determinative statutes in this case are as follows: 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-201 (1990). 
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Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-204 (1990). 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-205 (1990). 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-206 (1990). 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-207 (1990). 
Copies are attached in Appendix "G" to this brief. 
STATEMENT OP CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is a civil case involving a dispute over formation of a 
contract to supply building components to an elementary school. 
This case touches a sore spot with suppliers and subcontractors: 
general contractors who shop bids and who do not give timely notice 
of bid acceptance so costs can be fixed. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
On or about June 5, 1984, the plaintiff filed a complaint in 
the Second District Court for Weber County alleging a single cause 
of action for breach of contract against the defendant. Plaintiff 
claimed that there was a contract for the defendant to supply roof 
trusses to an elementary school in Weber County at a specified 
price and terms. (R. 17-19.) The defendant filed a motion for a 
change of venue to Utah County. (R. 4-12.) The plaintiff stipulated 
to the change of venue. (R. 1-2). The defendant thereafter filed 
an answer denying the existence of a contract and alleging, among 
other defenses, that the plaintiff's claims were barred by the 
statute of frauds, that plaintiff was estopped from asserting a 
contract and that plaintiff had failed to mitigate its damages. 
(R. 22-25) 
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Substantial initial discovery occurred at the outset of the 
case. (R. 27, 30 and 31.) The case thereafter languished and 
Quintek filed two separate motions to dismiss for failure to 
prosecute, on October 3, 1986 (R. 41) and again on March 14, 1990. 
(R. 69.) Both of these motions were denied and the case went to 
trial on August 13, 1990. 
The court below issued its ruling dated September 10, 1990, 
in favor of the defendant Quintek. (R. 151-152, Appendix lfD.n) 
Defendant had, prior to the lower court,s ruling, submitted its 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. (R. 158-162.) On 
October 10, 1990, the appellant, Herm Hughes, through its new 
counsel, filed a notice of appeal, even though no judgment had yet 
been entered. (R. 167.) On October 31, 1990, Herm Hughes filed its 
objections to the findings of fact and conclusions of law proposed 
by Quintek. (R. 188-203.) On December 5, 1990, the lower court 
received oral arguments from counsel on the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and on January 3, 1990, the lower entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 228-232, Appendix "E") 
and its Judgment (R. 221-222, Appendix "F"). Herm Hughes has since 
pursued its appeal pursuant to the previously filed notice. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc. (Herm Hughes) is a general con-
tractor. (R. 231.) Quintek is a manufacturer of wooden roof 
trusses. Quintek does not install the trusses or do work on the 
job site; it just sells trusses and delivers them to the project. 
(R. 231.) 
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In October, 1983, Herm Hughes bid on the Midland Elementary 
School in Roy, Utah, for the Weber County School District. (R. 
231.) A bid service operated by the Intermountain Contractor (a 
trade publication) advertised the project, and Herm Hughes received 
bids from several truss suppliers to furnish the roof trusses. (R. 
231.) One of the bids was from Quintek. (R. 231.) 
Quintek's bid proposal for the Midland Elementary School was 
verbally communicated to Herm Hughes on October 25, 1983, by 
telephone. Quintek then followed up the telephone call with a 
written bid proposal titled as "Cost Estimate." (R. 231, Exh. 6, 
Exh. 27.) The "Cost Estimate" (Appendix "A" hereto) specifically 
required acceptance thereof within ten days. Quintek's offer was 
not accepted within the ten-day period and was never signed and 
returned to Quintek. (R. 231, T. 87-88). Quintek expected notice 
of acceptance of their bid on the day the bids were opened or 
shortly thereafter. (T. 134-135) 
While Quintek did not receive any notice or communication from 
Herm Hughes following the bid opening, Quintek did hear from Mr. 
Larry Gilson, an engineer for one of their competitors, Oscar E. 
Chytraus Company. Mr. Gilson related that a week or two after the 
bid opening on the project in question, Herm Hughes invited him to 
come to its office to talk about the Chytraus bid. (T. 117-123.) 
The Chytraus Company's bid was the low bid on the dollar amount, 
but it included a discount of only five percent. (T. 122.) Mr. 
Gilson interpreted Herm Hughes' inquiries as bid shopping and told 
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Quintek about it. (R. 230.) Mr. Gilson declined to alter the 
Chytraus bid. 
On or about November 30, 1983, Quintek received from Herm 
Hughes a "Supplier Agreement." (Exhibit "11" and Appendix "B" 
hereto.) The "Supplier Agreement" was sent to Quintek on November 
29, 1983. (R. 231, T. 87-88, Exh. 9, Exh. 20.) Herm Hughes made 
it clear to Mr. Boyd Jacobson, president of Quintek, that Quintek 
had to agree to the terms of the Supplier Agreement if it was going 
to get the job. (T. 128). 
A more detailed agreement was expected to follow acceptance 
of Quintek's offer ("Cost Estimate") Quintek expected both a timely 
acceptance of the bid proposal and a "purchase order." (T. 141.) 
After receiving the Supplier Agreement, Mr. Jacobson, president of 
Quintek, rejected the same on the basis that he could not agree 
with the additional terms contained therein. (T. 129-131.) In 
particular, Mr. Jacobson objected to the part of Section 1 that 
obligated Quintek to Herm Hughes for the obligations Herm Hughes 
owed to the owner. (T. 145-146.) He objected to the part of 
Section 3 that allowed Herm Hughes to keep a ten percent retainage 
and to other payment terms. (T. 147.) He also objected to the 
liquidated damages provision of Section 4. (T. 129.) Mr. Jacobson 
voiced these objections to the "Supplier Agreement" to Todd Walker 
and told Mr. Walker he wouldn't sign the supplier agreement. (T. 
130-131.) The "Supplier Agreement" was never signed by Quintek. 
(T. 38, 57, 130-131.) Quintek acted promptly and reasonably in 
rejecting the supplier agreement. (R. 229) 
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Quintek made no lumber purchases for the job in question. (T. 
132.) Quintek never began fabrication of any trusses for the job 
in question. (T. 132-133.) Quintek never sent a bill to Herm Hughes 
and was never paid any money by Herm Hughes. (T. 133) 
Lumber is a commodity and the price of lumber is variable. 
(T. 133.) The cost of lumber constituted 50% - 60% of the total bid 
price for the trusses. (T. 133-134) 
During the period December 1, 1983 to approximately February 
8-9, 1984, the parties continued discussions about a possible 
contract and continued to negotiate over the terms under which 
Quintek would be willing to supply the trusses. This winter period 
was a slow time for Quintek and it wanted to conclude an agreement 
for the job in question. (T. 135.) During this period Quintek 
submitted a single shop drawing to Herm Hughes on or about December 
15, 1983. (Exh. 13.) The purpose in doing so was specifically 
stated by Mr. Boyd in his testimony: 
Q (By Mr. Lambert) Mr. Jacobsen [sic], let 
me ask you, given the background that you've 
just told us concerning this contract, what 
was the purpose of preparing shop drawings 
during the period of negotiation? 
A Todd [Herm Hughes' project supervisor] 
had asked me if we would begin preparing 
drawings because I had — I had told Todd that 
in order for us to perform on the contract in 
a time [sic] manner that they were asking for, 
that the shop drawings would have to be pro-
cessed during the time of negotiations. 
Later in February, Quintek prepared its own version of a 
supplier agreement. (Exh. 19, Appendix "C") This proposal was 
submitted to Herm Hughes on or about February 22, 1984, and 
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contained a statement of reasons why the proposal presented thereby 
stated an increased cost term. (T. 73, Exh. 19.) This proposal was 
rejected by Herm Hughes. (T. 75.) This proposal, with the discount, 
was lower than the bid ultimately accepted by Herm Hughes to supply 
the truss in question. (Exh. 24) 
Herm Hughes commenced an action against Quintek for breach of 
contract on June 5, 1984. (R. 17-19.) At the trial, which commenced 
on August 13, 1990, counsel for the plaintiff conceded that it was 
not suing on a written agreement, but argued that the issue to be 
decided was whether there was part performance which would remove 
the case from the ambit of the statute of frauds. (T. 106-112) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Point I. Plaintiff failed to raise the issues presented by 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-207 (1990) at trial and is therefore now 
precluded form raising these issues for the first time on appeal. 
Point II. The court correctly found that there was no agree-
ment formed between the parties and therefore no contract. The 
trial court did not articulate the specific standard of law it 
applied in entering its judgment; however, it is not apparent nor 
can it be shown that the court applied the "mirror image rule" from 
the common law of contracts to the issues of offer and acceptance. 
The trial court's decision is sustainable under the Uniform 
Commercial Code. The trial court found that there was no agreement 
between the parties under the Uniform Commercial Code. The trial 
court found that the alleged contract did not meet the prere-
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quisites of the Uniform Commercial Code's statute of frauds and was 
therefore not enforceable. This court should affirm the decision 
of the lower court where the findings of the court are not clearly 
erroneous and the conclusions are sustainable under a legal ground 
apparent on the record even when such law is not specifically 
articulated by the trial court as the basis for its decision. 
Because the trial court's decision is sustainable under the Uniform 
Commercial Code, the trial court's decision should be affirmed. 
Point III. The trial court correctly found, as a matter of 
law, that the supplier agreement was untimely because it came after 
the 10-day acceptance period set forth in Quintek's bid proposal. 
The court's decision is sustainable under the Uniform Commercial 
Code which states that acceptance will be cut off by the deadline 
stated in the offer. Plaintiff has not shown that the evidence was 
insufficient to support trial court's finding of fact that Quintek 
did not waive the 10-day acceptance requirement of his offer. 
The court was correct in finding that there was not a waiver of the 
deadline. 
Point IV. The trial court correctly found that the conduct 
of the parties did not form an agreement or contract. The findings 
of fact adequately support a determination that the conduct did not 
rise to such a level. 
Point V. Inequities would result if an offeror was to be held 
to prices quoted under an expired offer where quotes were based 
upon underlying quotes for material costs that had also expired. 
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Point VI. Appellee should be awarded fees and costs because 
the appeal is without merit and was taken without a reasonable 
likelihood of success. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
HERM HUGHES FAILED TO ARGUE THE PROVISIONS OF 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-2-2 07 IN THE LOWER COURT 
AND FAILED TO ARGUE WAIVER AND CANNOT NOW 
RAISE THESE ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL. 
At trial Quintek raised as a defense that Herm Hughes's claims 
were barred by the statute of frauds contained in the Uniform 
Commercial Code enacted as Utah Code Ann. (R. 8, 9, 12.) Herm 
Hughes did not argue any aspects of the Uniform Commercial Code 
and, during arguments about the admissibility of certain exhibits, 
the attorney for Herm Hughes stated: 
MR. WEEKS: I think Mr. Lambert has — has 
tried to focus on the fact the we've got to 
have a written agreement here or we can't have 
an agreement. There is nothing in the statute 
of frauds that says you can't have an oral 
agreement and show us in part performance, the 
very exception to the statute of frauds, to 
get it out of the statue of frauds. We didn't 
just sue on a written contract, we sued for 
contract. And — and it would be very nice to 
be able to say, let's pin down the exact 
moment which a contract occurred. 
T. 107. 
* * * * 
I think it's an exception to the statue 
of frauds, I don't think there's any question 
about it, I think we have, in the course — 
THE COURT: On the basis of part perfor-
mance, is that what you're claiming — 
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MR. WEEKS: That's correct. 
THE COURT: That's the exception? 
MR. WEEKS: . . . And even absent the 
written contract, we haven't sued on a written 
contract, we've sued for contract, and we 
believe that all of these exhibits show that 
that contract existed. 
I can't pin down the day the contract 
existed. . . 
T. 108-109. (Emphasis added.) 
Based on these comments and the absence of any reference at 
trial by Herm Hughes to the Uniform Commercial Code, the court, 
during closing argument by counsel for Herm Hughes, made the 
following comments inviting Herm Hughes's counsel to address the 
Commercial Code issues: 
THE COURT: . . . I hate to keep inter-
rupting you here, but I think that the UCC is 
going to come into play much more than either 
of you have indicated to the Court before this 
is through. 
T. 177. 
Despite this general reference to the UCC and the invitation 
to address the issues, Herm Hughes' counsel continued to argue the 
part performance exception and never addressed the issues relating 
to § 70A-2-207 or waiver. 
It is well established that failure to raise an issue at trial 
precludes raising the issue on appeal. As the Supreme Court of 
Utah stated in Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P. 2d 938 (Utah 1987) , "We have 
held that matters not raised at the trial court level will not be 
considered by this Court on appeal, particularly when the problem 
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could have been resolved below." Id. at 945. See also Franklin 
Financial v. New Empire Develop. Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah 
1983) . 
As more particularly set forth in Point II herein, Quintek 
believes that the trial court did consider all the pertinent 
sections of the Commercial Code and that it correctly found under 
the facts presented that no contract was ever formed and that no 
waiver of the time requirements for acceptance accrued; however, 
the court need not even consider these issues in light of the 
failure on the part of Herm Hughes to even raise the issues at 
trial. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THERE WAS 
NO AGREEMENT FORMED BETWEEN THE PARTIES. THE TRIAL 
COURT'S DECISION SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE IT IS 
SUSTAINABLE UNDER THE APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF 
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE. 
A. The courts' findings should be affirmed where they are 
sustainable under any proper legal ground apparent from the record. 
The court in Edwards v. Iron County, 531 P.2d 476, 477 (Utah 
1975) (citing Goodsell v. Department of Business Regulation, 523 
P.2d 1230 (Utah 1974)), held in footnote number 3 that the judgment 
under review should be affirmed if it is sustainable upon any 
proper legal ground apparent from the record. In Goodsell the 
trial court had directed the Department of Business Regulation to 
issue a certificate to a journeyman plumber holding that the 
statute applied in denying the license was unconstitutional. 
Although the Supreme Court of Utah found that the trial court had 
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erred in holding the statute unconstitutional, they affirmed the 
decision of the trial court on the grounds that the action of the 
defendant was arbitrary, capricious and without foundation in fact 
or law. In Goodsell the court held in citing 5 C.J.S. Appeal and 
Error § 1461(1) : 
The appellate court will affirm the judgment, order, or 
decree appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal 
ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such 
ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial 
court to be the basis of its ruling or action, and this 
is true even though such ground or theory is not urged 
or argued on appeal by appellee, was not raised in the 
lower court, and was not considered or passed on by the 
lower court. 
Id. at 1232. See also Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc. , 657 P.2d 
267, 276 (Utah 1982). 
In the present case, it is clear that the ruling of the lower 
court is sustainable under the Uniform Commercial Code legal theory 
that there is not a contract where there was no "agreement.11 The 
facts would support the court's ruling that there was no agreement. 
Therefore, this court should affirm the lower court's holding where 
it is sustainable upon a proper legal ground apparent from the 
record. 
It is the burden of the appellant, Herm Hughes, to marshal the 
evidence which supports the court's findings and to demonstrate 
why that evidence is insufficient to support the findings of fact 
made by the court. As stated in General Glass Corp. v. Mast 
Construction Co. , 766 P.2d 429, 433 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citations 
omitted): 
As we have said on numerous occasions, in 
order to challenge a finding of fact, it is an 
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appellant's burden to marshal all the evidence 
that supports the court's finding and then 
demonstrate, why, even viewing it in the light 
most favorable to the court below, it is 
insufficient to support the finding made . . 
. Only then can we consider whether these 
findings are "clearly erroneous11 under Rule 
52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In the present case, the appellant has utterly failed to even 
attempt to meet this requirement. The appellant has erroneously 
characterized this appeal as simply being one where the conclusions 
of law are to be reviewed for correctness. Appellant's whole 
argument hinges upon a position, not asserted at the trial level, 
that appellee Quintek waived the ten-day acceptance requirement 
stated in its "Cost Estimate". Conduct rising to the level of 
waiver is inherently a fact question, not a question of law. Rees 
v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc.. 808 P. 2d 1069 (Utah 1991) Such 
a question is not to be reviewed for correctness, but is to be 
reviewed under the standard as set forth in the above-cited General 
Glass Corp. decision. Herm Hughes' appeal, therefore, must fail 
for having failed to meet this basic requirement concerning the 
findings of the court below. The mere fact that on the same 
evidence an appellate court might have reached a different result 
does not justify it in setting aside the finding as a finding is 
"erroneous only if it is without evidentiary support." State v. 
Walker, 743 P. 2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987) (citing Wright & Miller, 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2585 (1971)). As stated in 
Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), "Therefore, 
our review is strictly limited to whether the trial court's 
findings of fact support its conclusions of law and judgment." 
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The court below certainly had evidence to find that while 
Quintek desired to contract with Herm Hughes and engaged in 
negotiations, the discussions and conduct on the part of Quintek 
were in the nature of negotiations for a potential contract and did 
not constitute a waiver of the time within which Herm Hughes was 
required to accept the "Cost Estimate". On this basis alone, the 
appeal of Herm Hughes must fail. 
B. Herm Hughes has not shown that the lower court applied 
an erroneous standard of law on the issue of contract formation. 
Quintek agrees that the Uniform Commercial Code sections that 
refer to the sale of goods would be applicable in the present case 
had Herm Hughes raised them in the lower court. Quintek contends 
that Herm Hughes has not shown that the court did not apply the 
pertinent sections of the Uniform Commercial Code. The court does 
not specifically state in its findings what theories of law it 
applied in reaching its decision. It does not state that it was 
applying the common law of contracts in reaching its decision. It 
does not mention the term "meeting of the minds" or any other term 
that would indicate it was applying the common law doctrine. Herm 
Hughes has not shown that the court applied an incorrect legal 
standard. 
Contrary to Herm Hughes's claim it is apparent that the trial 
court did apply the Uniform Commercial Code. The trial court in 
closing arguments specifically stated he believed that the UCC was 
applicable. (T. 177.) The trial court, in its findings, used the 
term "agreement" in indicating that there was no agreement between 
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the parties. The term "agreement" is a defined term in the Uniform 
Commercial Code. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-204(l) provides in per-
tinent part: "A contract for sale of goods may be made in any 
manner sufficient to show agreement, . . . " Under this section 
an agreement is required to be found in order for a contract to be 
formed. It is apparent from the record that the court was applying 
the Uniform Commercial Code in finding that there was no agreement 
between the parties, and therefore did not err. 
C. The courts' finding that no agreement was formed is 
sustainable under the Uniform Commercial Code. 
1. The lower courts7 finding that no agreement was 
formed is sustainable under Utah Code Ann. S 70A-2-204. 
The Uniform Commercial Code, Utah Code Ann. § 7 0A-2-2 04, 
states that "a contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner 
sufficient to show agreement including conduct by both parties 
which recognizes the existence of such a contract." The court 
below found that there was no agreement between the parties, and 
therefore no contract. 
Under the facts of the present case, Quintek submitted the 
"Cost Estimate" to Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc. with the condition that 
it be accepted within 10 days from the date of the estimate/bid. 
The date of receipt of the "Cost Estimate" was October 27, 1983, 
and therefore the cut-off date would have been November 5, 1983. 
The court found that Herm Hughes did not in any manner accept 
Quintek's "Cost Estimate" by November 5, 1983. The findings of 
fact of the court show that Herm Hughes never signed the "Cost 
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Estimate" of Quintek and did not even communicate with Quintek 
until late November, 1983. Under the findings of fact No. 9 it has 
been determined that the document which Herm Hughes now attempts 
to characterize as an acceptance was received by Quintek on or 
about November 30, 1983. 
Although Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-204 does not require an offer 
and acceptance in order to show agreement, Herm Hughes now claims 
on appeal that this was the manner in which an agreement was made 
and that there was an offer and an acceptance sufficient to show 
agreement between the parties in the present case. Herm Hughes 
now claims on appeal that he accepted Quintek's offer by sending 
Quintek a supplier agreement. Herm Hughes claims that the "Sup-
plier Agreement" constituted a seasonable expression of an accep-
tance and relies upon Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-207(l) which states: 
A definite and seasonable expression of accep-
tance or a written confirmation which is sent 
within a reasonable time operates as an accep-
tance even though it states terms additional 
to or different from those offered or agreed 
upon, unless acceptance is expressly made 
conditional on assent to the additional or 
different terms. 
The court in the present case found the alleged acceptance on the 
part of Herm Hughes to be untimely because it was received after 
the offer expired. Where the offer in this case clearly expired 
ten days after being submitted according to its terms and there was 
no acceptance within that time period, there could not have been 
a valid acceptance because the offer was no longer valid. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-2 05 states that: "an offer by a 
merchant to buy or sell goods in a signed writing, which by its 
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terms gives assurance that it will be held open, is not revokable 
for lack of consideration during the time stated, or if no time is 
stated for a reasonable time." The Uniform Commercial Code section 
cited above clearly indicates that an offer remains open for a 
"reasonable time" only if a time period is not specified in the 
offer. The above section does not require that an offer be held 
open beyond the time stated. In the present case, the offer was 
automatically revoked after ten days according to its terms there 
was no longer an offer open for Herm Hughes to accept. Freedom of 
contract is an express principle of the Uniform Commercial Code. 
See Official Code Comment 2 to Uniform Commercial Code § 1-102. 
It is axiomatic that parties are free to contract on their own 
terms. Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455 (Utah 1983). 
Nothing in the Uniform Commercial Code has any effect to prevent 
a party from limiting the time for acceptance of an offer. The 
court's finding that there was no agreement formed between the 
parties, and therefore, no contract is sustainable under the 
Uniform Commercial Code. 
Herm Hughes virtually ignores the conclusion of the trial 
court that the "Supplier Agreement" was untimely and instead 
focuses its argument on the effect of the differing terms of the 
"Supplier Agreement" and the original offer document. Where there 
was not even an agreement formed for all the reasons stated in this 
brief, the issue of differing terms never arises. The issue in the 
present case is whether the supplier agreement constituted an 
acceptance where it came after the expiration of acceptance period. 
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Further, Herm Hughes incorrectly applies Utah Code Ann. 
§ 70A-2-207(1). The official comments to § 2-207 provide in part: 
111. This section is intended to deal with two typical situations. 
The one is the written confirmation, . . . The other situation is 
offer and acceptance, . . . Often the sellers form contains terms 
different from or additional to those set forth in the buyer's 
form. Nevertheless the parties proceed with the transaction." 
In the present case there was not an offer and an acceptance, and 
the parties did not proceed with the transaction. This section of 
the Uniform Commercial Code was intended to clarify what terms 
apply where the parties have proceeded and are arguing over the 
terms of their agreement. In the present case there was not a 
valid acceptance, neither was there performance. The parties were 
merely in the process of negotiating. Quintek denies that a 
contract was ever formed. This section does not apply in the 
present case, because it was only intended to apply where both 
parties have admitted a contract. This section is based on the 
assumption that it is admitted that there is a contract and the 
controversy is only as to its terms. See Marlene Industries Corp. 
v. Carnac Textiles, Inc., 408 N.Y.S.2d 410, 380 N.E.2d 239 (1978). 
The court in U.S. Industries, Inc. v. Semco Mfg. , Inc., 562 F.2d 
1061, 1067 (1979)(citing R. Duesenberg & L. King Bender's Uniform 
Commercial Code Service § 3.05, at 3-51 (1977); Duval & Co. v. 
Mai com, 233 Ga. 784, 214 S.E.2d 356 (1975)) stated that "an 
^acceptance' is a prerequisite to the application of § 2-207 and 
that only where all the traditional criteria of intent are met 
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should Section 2-207 be applied; only then should the prescription 
of Section 2-207 as to additional terms become relevant." Utah 
Code Ann. § 70A-2-207 does not apply in the present case. 
2. The alleged contract in the present case is not enforce-
able because it does not meet the requirements of the statute of 
frauds applicable to the sale of goods under the Uniform Commercial 
Code. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-201(l) states in pertinent part: 
Except as otherwise provided in this section, 
a contract for the sale of goods for the price 
of $500 or more is not enforceable by way of 
action or defense unless there is some writing 
sufficient to indicate that a contract for 
sale has been made between the parties and 
signed by the party against whom enforcement 
is sought or by his authorized agent or bro-
ker. 
The alleged contract in the present case must meet the 
requirements of the above statute of frauds. The alleged contract 
would have involved the sale of goods with a price in excess of 
$500.00. However, there was no writing in the present case 
sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale had been made 
between the parties. The original offer document was not signed 
by Herm Hughes and therefore did not constitute a sufficient 
writing. The document sent by Herm Hughes to Quintek was not 
signed by Quintek nor did it indicate that a contract for sale had 
been made. Herm Hughes does not allege that there were any other 
documents that constituted a contract. Therefore, there is no 
writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been 
made between the parties and signed by Quintek. 
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Herm Hughes's whole argument at trial was that partial perfor-
mance would substitute for the requirements of subsection (1) which 
requires a signed writing; however, Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-201(3) 
outlines the only conditions upon which partial performance may 
substitute for a signed writing as follows: 
A contract which does not satisfy the require-
ments of Subsection (1) but which is valid in 
other respects is enforceable 
(a) if the goods are to be specifically manu-
factured for the buyer and are not suitable 
for sale to others in the ordinary course of 
the seller's business and the seller, before 
notice of repudiation is received and under 
circumstances which reasonably indicate that 
the goods are for the buyer, has made either 
substantial beginning of their manufacture or 
commitments for their procurement; or 
(b) if the party against whom enforcement is 
sought admits in his pleading, testimony or 
otherwise in court that a contract for sale 
was made, but the contract is not enforceable 
under this provision beyond the quantity of 
goods admitted; or 
(c) with respect to goods for which payment 
has been made and accepted or which have been 
received and accepted. (Section 70A-2-606.) 
None of the requirements of Subsection (3) have been met by Herm 
Hughes or Quintek sufficient to make the alleged contract enforce-
able as against the signed writing requirement. Quintek, which 
would have manufactured the goods under the alleged contract, is 
not alleging that it substantially began the manufacture of the 
goods or commitments for their procurement, nor does it admit that 
a contract for sale was made. Neither did Herm Hughes make any 
payments, and no goods were delivered to Herm Hughes. 
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The writings in the present case do not constitute a suffi-
cient writing under the statute of frauds. In order for a writing 
to be sufficient to bind under the Uniform Commercial Code § 2-
201(2), the writing must indicate that there is a completed 
transaction as to goods and state the quantity of goods. See W. 
H. Barber Co. v. MacNamera-Vivant Contracting Co., 293 N.W.2d 351 
(Minn. 1979); Rockland Industries, Inc. v. Frank Kasmir Associates, 
470 F. Supp. 1176 (N.D. Tex. 1979). An original offer document was 
submitted to Herm Hughes; however, a writing which is merely an 
offer is not a sufficient writing under the statute of frauds, as 
it does not indicate that there has been a completed transaction. 
See Ellis v. Robbett Manufacturing Co. , 328 F. Supp. 1377 (N.D. 
Ga.), aff'd, 445 F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1970.) Neither does a purchase 
order of a buyer satisfy the statute of frauds as it does not show 
that a contract has been made. See Nations Enterprises, Inc. v. 
Process Equipment Co. , 40 Colo. App. 390, 579 P.2d 655 (1970). 
None of the writings in the present case indicated that there was 
a completed transaction. 
Where the requirements of the statute of frauds are not met, 
the alleged contract is not enforceable by way of action or 
defense. Cox v. Cox, 292 Ala. 106, 289 So. 2d 609 (1974); Jurek 
v. Thompson, 308 Minn. 191, 241 N.W. 2d 788 (1976). 
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3. The lower court 's finding concerning bid shopping 
by Herm Hughes justifies a conclusion that Ouintek/s original offer 
was rejected and that Herm Hughes's "Supplier Agreement" was a new 
offer which was rejected by Quintek. 
The trial court made specific findings concerning bid shop-
ping. (Findings of Fact No. 8) The court further found that 
Quintek was advised of Herm Hughes's efforts to "shop" its bid. 
These facts alone would have allowed the court to correctly 
conclude that Quintek's bid was rejected and that, "viewing all of 
the evidence together, this court is unable to conclude that 
plaintiff has established its case by a preponderance. . . . " (R. 
151) 
POINT III 
THE COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE SUPPLIER AGREEMENT 
WAS UNTIMELY AS AN ACCEPTANCE BECAUSE IT CAME AFTER 
THE 10-DAY ACCEPTANCE PERIOD IN 
QUINTEK'S "COST ESTIMATE". 
"An offer for the sale of goods must be accepted within the 
time specified by the offeror, . . . If acceptance is not timely 
made, there is by hypothesis no contract of sale." 67 Am. Jur. 2d 
Sales § 85. When an offer is made for a specified period of time, 
it cannot be accepted after the lapse of that time." Gilbert & 
Bennett Mfg. Co. v. Westincrhouse Electric Corp. , 445 F. Supp. 537 
(1977). There is nothing in the Uniform Commercial Code regulating 
offers as such and, therefore, prior principles of contract law 
continue in force because not displaced. See § 1-103; 2 R. 
Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code, § 2-206, at 258 (3rd Ed. 1982). 
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The trial court held that Herm Hughes had not accepted the offer 
of Quintek within the time specified by Quintek in his offer and, 
therefore, there was no contract. Herm Hughes does not argue that 
Quintek was not justified in including in his offer the acceptance 
period or that Herm Hughes accepted within the time period allot-
ted. The court was correct in holding that there was no contract 
formed. 
The trial court specifically concluded from the facts pre-
sented that there had been no waiver on the part of Quintek by its 
continued efforts to pursue an agreement with Herm Hughes. (Con-
clusions of Law No.7) (R. 228) 
Herm Hughes, however, claims that Quintek waived the accept-
ance period under the original offer and that the court erred in 
holding that acceptance of the offer was untimely. Herm Hughes 
cites Swisher v. Clark. 209 P. 2d 880 (Okla. 1949) in asserting that 
Quintek had waived the ten-day acceptance period. In Swisher the 
buyer presented a written offer to the seller to purchase land. 
The offer expired by its terms at a certain time on a certain date. 
The seller did not accept the offer by the expiration date. The 
buyer then approached the seller after the expiration date, 
presented the original offer document and requested that the seller 
sign the original offer document. The seller signed the original 
offer document but later failed to convey the subject land. The 
buyer sued for specific performance. The seller argued that 
because the expiration date in the original offer document had 
passed neither party was bound by the signed document. The court 
24 
in Swisher noted that the expiration date was put into the offer 
document to protect the buyer and that the buyer had knowingly 
waived the provision by her conduct. There are glaring differences 
between the fact pattern in Swisher and the fact pattern in the 
present case. In the present case Quintek did not approach Herm 
Hughes with the original offer document and request that Herm 
Hughes sign it, and no documents were ever signed between the 
parties as had been done in Swisher. The findings of the court in 
the present case only show that Quintek received the "Supplier 
Agreement," which was not the original offer document, from Herm 
Hughes which Quintek subsequently refused to sign. 
Second, the holding of the court in Swisher supports Quintets 
case rather than Herm Hughes's case. The court held that where the 
offer specifies a time of acceptance, acceptance after that time 
will be nugatory as an acceptance, unless the offerer assents 
thereto with full knowledge that it was not made within the period 
named. 209 P.2d at 885. Quintek in the present case has not 
assented to an acceptance of the original offer document and 
therefore has not waived the acceptance period. In Swisher the 
party who presented the offer acknowledged his waiver contrary to 
the present case. Swisher is therefore distinguishable from the 
present case and does not present support for Herm Hughes in 
alleging that Quintek waived the offer acceptance period. 
Herm Hughes also cites B.R. Woodward Marketing, Inc. v. 
Collins Food Service, Inc.. 754 P. 2d 99 (Utah App. 1988) which 
stated: 
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Waiver is the "intentional relinquishment of 
a known right." Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d at 
123 0. To waive a right there must be an 
existing right, benefit, or advantage; know-
ledge of its existence; and an intention to 
relinquish it. Id. The party's actions or 
conduct must unequivocally evince an intent to 
waive or must at least be inconsistent with 
any other intent. Id. 
In the present case there was no intention on the part of Quintek 
to relinquish its right to revoke its offer which expired auto-
matically after the ten-day acceptance period, nor was its conduct 
inconsistent with any other intent. Indeed, Quintek's conduct is 
consistent with its intent to try to reach an agreement with Herm 
Hughes regarding the trusses even though the original offer had 
expired. Quintek did not renew its original offer in any manner 
or waive the ten-day acceptance period in any way. 
Further, in the present case, if Quintek did approach Herm 
Hughes to request a contract, it merely shows that Quintek was 
willing to form a contract if the parties could reach an agreement 
with terms that were satisfactory. Even though Herm Hughes had 
let the offer lapse, Quintek was still willing to try to reach an 
agreement with Herm Hughes until it became apparent that an 
agreement would not be reached. 
Quintek was further justified in believing no agreement had 
been reached in light of the facts which reveal that Herm Hughes 
requested another company to lower its bid after the bids were 
opened. Herm Hughes did not notify Quintek if its bid had been or 
would be accepted. Herm Hughes gave Quintek no indication whatso-
ever that it even possibly planned to contract with Quintek. 
26 
Quintek had no way of knowing that Herm Hughes was even considering 
contracting with Quintek. Quintek had previously been informed by 
another bidder that Herm Hughes had requested Oscar E. Chytraus 
Co. to lower its bid and thought that Herm Hughes was bid shopping. 
The findings do not show that Quintek presented its offer again or 
requested Herm Hughes to sign the original offer document or that 
Quintek even discussed the terms of the original offer. They do 
not show any behavior on the part of Quintek that would indicate 
that it had waived the acceptance period on the original offer. 
Further, Herm Hughes attempts to cloud the issue by citing 
certain cases from other jurisdictions which hold that a document 
is an acceptance even though it contains terms different from the 
terms in the offer. Herm Hughes ignores the fact that none of the 
cases it cites are cases where the offer had already expired and 
therefore acceptance was invalid as in the present case. The cases 
cited are cases with fact patterns where the parties are arguing 
over the terms of the contracts admittedly formed. Specifically, 
Herm Hughes cites Boese-Hilburn Co. v. Dean Machinery Co. , 616 S.W. 
2d 520 (Mo. App. 1981) ; Chicopee Concrete Service, Inc. v. Hart 
Engineering Co., 479 N.E. 2d 748 (Mass. App. 1985); J. Baranello 
& Sons v. Hausmann Industries, Inc., 571 F. Supp. 333 (E.D.N.Y. 
1983). In Boese-Hilburn Co., supra, the parties were arguing over 
inconsistencies between the purchase order and the quotation which 
constituted the offer and acceptance in that case, not over whether 
an offer had expired or an acceptance period had been waived. The 
court's holdings are irrelevant to the present case. In Chicopee, 
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both parties added additional terms to the documents and signed and 
delivered all documents. Again the issue was not whether an offer 
had expired but rather whether the differing terms of the documents 
prevented a contract from being formed. In the present case, the 
parties signed no documents and came to no agreements. In Bara-
nello, the court found that the documents exchanged demonstrated 
an agreement on the essential terms of the parties' bargain, but 
again the issue did not involve an expired offer acceptance period. 
None of the cases cited by Herm Hughes are pertinent to the 
particular facts in the instant case, but rather address in general 
terms the effect of differing terms between offers and accep-
tances. 
The trial court was correct in holding there was no agreement 
and the acceptance period had not been waived and therefore expired 
according to its term on November 5, 1983. The trial court was 
correct in holding that the "Supplier Agreement" received by 
Quintek in late November of 1983 did not constitute an acceptance 
because it was untimely. The trial court's decision should be 
upheld where it is not incorrect. Bricrham v. Moon Lake Elec. 
Ass'n.. 470 P.2d 393 (Utah 1970). 
POINT IV 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE CONDUCT 
OP THE PARTIES DID NOT FORM AN AGREEMENT. 
The conduct required to form a contract under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 70A-2-204 is conduct which "recognizes the existence of such 
contract." Id. The conduct of Quintek and Herm Hughes in the 
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present case did not recognize the existence of a contract or an 
agreement. According to Finding of Fact 13 Quintek never began 
fabrication of the trusses in question. After the "Cost Estimate" 
was submitted to Herm Hughes by Quintek, Larry Gilson of Oscar E. 
Chytraus Co., who had also submitted a "Cost Estimate" to Herm -
Hughes, contacted Boyd Jacobson of Quintek and advised him that he 
had been contacted by Herm Hughes and had been requested to reduce 
his bid, and in the opinion of Larry Gilson, Herm Hughes was bid 
shopping. (Finding of Fact No. 8.) Herm Hughes, after contacting 
Larry Gilson, did not sign a contract with either Quintek or Larry 
Gilson, and the expected procedure was not followed in signing the 
"Cost Estimate" of Quintek by the ten-day offer period. 
Further, although the findings of the court indicate that a 
supplier agreement was sent to Quintek, it was not received until 
November 30, 1983, after the offer of Quintek had expired. Even 
after Quintek received the "Supplier Agreement," Quintek refused 
to sign it. 
Under the Findings of Fact, it is readily apparent that the 
offer which was originally made by Quintek was never accepted in 
any manner and that there was never an agreement formed between the 
parties that Quintek would provide trusses. There was no contract 
formed between the parties during that ten-day period, nor were 
there any actions taken by either party during the ten-day period 
to indicate performance in any manner under the offer. The facts 
show that a drawing was sent to Herm Hughes and various discussions 
occurred relative to a possible contract for Quintek to fabricate 
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the trusses in question. However, none of the conduct of the 
parties indicated that any agreement had been reached or that any 
terms had been decided upon. Quintek was aware that Herm Hughes 
needed trusses. Herm Hughes was aware from the "Cost Estimate" 
that Quintek could provide trusses, but Quintek never agreed by its 
conduct or otherwise that it would provide trusses for Herm Hughes. 
The parties were merely in the process of trying to agree. The 
conduct of the parties did not rise to the level of recognizing the 
existence of a contract. The court was not incorrect in holding 
that the conduct of the parties did not form an agreement. 
POINT V 
PUBLIC POLICY WOULD DISCOURAGE THE COURT FROM 
FINDING THAT A CONTRACT HAD BEEN FORMED BETWEEN 
THE PARTIES UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE PRESENT CASE. 
In the present case the conclusion that Herm Hughes con-
troverts most is that its alleged acceptance was untimely because 
it came after the expiration of the 10-day acceptance period. If 
the court were to determine that Quintek was to be held to the 
prices quoted in his original offer document although the offer 
expired according to its terms after 10 days and where Quintek 
never intended to waive the acceptance period, it would have the 
effect of invalidating written acceptance periods where the subject 
of the contract dictates that a limited time for acceptance is 
necessary, i.e., commodities. The purpose of the acceptance period 
in a "Cost Estimate" to construct certain goods is for the protec-
tion of the bidder. The bidder will quote a price that is based 
upon his cost. In the present case, the bid was based upon the 
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cost of the materials necessary for the construction of the 
product. The bidders' estimate of the cost of materials is often 
based upon a quote that is also available for a certain time 
period. The cost of the lumber and other commodities in a supply 
and demand economy may vary in a short time period. A bidder would 
take a substantial loss if he were to be held to an offer price 
based upon a low material price that had risen before he could 
contract for the materials because he was waiting for an acceptance 
of his offer. The acceptance period in a contract is usually the 
same period for which the producer believes he can obtain the 
underlying materials at a given price. Suppliers may have other 
legitimate reasons for limiting the period for acceptance of a 
"Cost Estimate", i.e., the need to know whether contract commit-
ments will exceed production capacity within time requirements. 
Had Herm Hughes wanted to form a contract with Quintek or be 
assured it could obtain the price quoted in the original offer 
document it very easily could have followed the expected procedure 
of signing the "Cost Estimate" of Quintek within the 10-day 
acceptance period or even presenting the supplier agreement within 
the 10-day acceptance period or indicated in any other manner that 
he accepted the offer so that Quintek could obtain the underlying 
materials at its expected price. Even after the ten-day acceptance 
period had Herm Hughes wanted to accept Quintek's offer, Herm 
Hughes could have established its intent to accept the original 
terms by indicating to Quintek that it wished to do so or signed 
a contract with Quintek and perhaps Quintek would have considered 
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waiving the ten-day acceptance period and formed a contract if it 
could still obtain the materials at expected cost. Rather it 
appears that Herm Hughes still hoped to form an agreement more 
favorable than the terms of the offer it had originally received, 
and it did not form an agreement with Quintek to provide the 
trusses. 
Further, if Quintek in the present case were to be held to 
have formed a contract even though no agreement was ever reached 
or no contract of any kind ever signed, the message to the public 
would be that once an offer is made you can be held accountable for 
the terms of that offer even if it is not accepted and even if the 
acceptance period has expired. A producer could not be sure that 
he would not take a loss once he had made an offer with a quoted 
price based on the underlying market cost of materials. If Quintek 
were to be held to the prices originally offered without the 
assurance that the underlying material prices would remain fixed 
at the level relied on by Quintek in making the offer, it would be 
entirely inequitable to Quintek. Further, buyers under the "Cost 
Estimate" system would be free to bid shop and take advantage of 
offers that had been made during a time when materials could be 
obtained at a low price while they also waited to see if prices 
would fall and perhaps receive a lower bid from another party. Herm 
Hughes in this case did not have clean hands as evidenced by its 
bid shopping. For the court to now hold Quintek to prices quoted 
in the original offer document would be to encourage others to deal 
in such a manner. 
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The intended purpose of the sections of the Uniform Commercial 
Code cited was to clarify terms of contracts where the terms of the 
offer and acceptance differed but where the parties had proceeded 
with the performance of the contract anyway. The intended purpose 
of the sections was not to imply a contract between parties where 
no agreement was actually reached by the parties. 
POINT VI 
QUINTEK IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS FEES 
PURSUANT TO RULE 33(a), UTAH 
RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE. 
In the present case, the critical issues are those concerning 
waiver and course of conduct allegedly creating a contract, which 
are fact questions subject to review for sufficiency of evidence. 
The appellant, Herm Hughes, did not even acknowledge this standard 
of review for these fact questions. Instead, the appellant devoted 
the bulk of its brief to discussion of Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-207, 
a statute which appellant never cited or argued at trial. Appellee 
respectfully submits that the appeal herein is frivolous and 
subject to an award of attorneys fees pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 
33(a). As this court has stated, sanctions should be imposed when 
an appeal is obviously without any merit and has been taken without 
reasonable likelihood of prevailing. Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988); Mauahn v. Maughn. 770 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly found that there is no agreement 
formed between the parties and therefore no contract. The trial 
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court correctly determined that the "Supplier Agreement" sent by 
the plaintiff was untimely because it came after the 10 day 
acceptance period as set forth in Quintet/s "Cost Estimate," that 
this 10 day acceptance period was not waived by Quintek, and that 
thereafter the conduct of the parties did not form an agreement or 
a contract. 
The alleged contract in the present case was for the sale of 
goods and the Uniform Commercial Code presents guidance for this 
case. The Court7s decision below is sustainable under the Uniform 
Commercial Code and therefore should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this 7th day of August, 1991. 
DAVZt) LAMBERT/and 
DANIELLE M. FERRDN, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS &JpETERSEN 
Attorneys for Appellee Quintek 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing were mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this 7th 
day of August, 1991. 
Clark B. Fetzer, Esq. 
Howell, Fetzer & Hendrickson 
700 Walker Center 
175 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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APPENDIX "A" 
Cost Estimate 
Pit txnibit 
P.O. Box 76, Provo, Utah 8460i 
(801)377-0907 -(UmH*)5-9G7&. 
COST ESTIMATE 
ESTIMATE IQ.^Cff /&64GZ &<XX/. JOB: &V' &S&te*7Z*y DATF /0/is/t* 
JOB ADDRESS: 
. PHONE- SUSP. DATE:. 
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Z 
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&&/.<M 
&L 7?fe 72&CXL. 
We agree to famish all above items for the sum of 
provided this esta te is accepted within /c? day| from abovC^^ 
E S T I M A T O R ^ W y &**CW ACCEPTED *f. 
T 0 TAL AMOUNT: 
DATE. 
P.O. Box 76, Provo, Utah 84601 
(801)377-0907 -(S^^SySWft- #3? 
COST ESTIMATE 
ESTIMATE T O : / ^ 5 Z ^ / ^ g * f e 5 &<&%/ JOB: &Y£&?t£?*7**y DATF: 4?U>j/#3 
JOB ADDRESS.. PHONE:. . SUSP. DATE:. 
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/ 
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^ 3 - ^ ^ C/rc^pu^r S00*rs 
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EXTN'D 
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TOTAL AMOUNT. 
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7\ 
/ 
We agree to furnish all above items for the sum of ~><^r &zx?tf5 
provided this esfrpsiate is accepted within '£/ days from above date 
m?J&£' 4&?'& 
^ . ACCEPTED BY. DATE. 
APPENDIX "B" 
Supplier Agreement 
HERM HUGHES & SONS INC. GENERAL CONTRACTORS 
P.O. Box 256 1650 West 500 South 
Phone (801) 292-1411 West Bountiful, Utah 84087 
November 21, 1983 P!fExhibit 
Quintek ^« ^ 
P. 0. Box 76 V&ysY 
Provo, Utah 84601 
RE: MIDLAND ELEMENTARY SCHOOL / Roy, Utah 
Gentlemen: 
We are enclosing two copies of the agreement for the above 
project. Please sign and return one copy to our office as 
soon as possible. 
Please prepare your monthly estimates as follows: 
1. Submit invoices to our office no later than 
the 15th of the month. 
2. Contract amount: 
% work completed to date 
less 10% retainage 
Amount earned to date 
Less previous payments^ 
Net due this estimate 
3. Shop drawings and/or color samples must be in our 
office within two weeks of the date of this letter 
so that we can forward them to the Architect for 
approval . 
Sincerely, 
HERM HUGHES & SONS, INC. 
Todd Walker 
Project Manager 
This A G R E E M E N T made this J5_th_ day of November in the year of N i n e t e e n Hundred 
and Eighty Three by and between HERM HUTTOT5 ~l _S ON S_ INC^, here i na f t er called the 
C o n t r a c t o r and QJJINTEK here! naf te"r" caTTe cT^tHe " S u p p W r for the c o n s t r u c t i o n of 
M i 2 L A N D _ E L E M E N T A 5 Y ^ T T J 5 0 L for WEBER_SCHOOL_DJ^STR^CT h e r e i n a f t e r called the O w n e r . 
W I T N E S S E T H , that the Supplier and C o n t r a c t o r for c o n s i d e r a t i o n h e r e i n a f t e r named 
agree as f o i l o w s : 
S E C T I O N 1. It is agreed that the Supplier shall be bound to the C o n t r a c t o r 
by the terms of the Ceneral C o n t r a c t , the General C o n d i t i o n s , Special C o n d i t i o n s , 
D r a w i n g s , Addendum 1 and S p e c i f i c a t i o n s for MIDLAND E L E M E N T A R Y . He shall assume 
toward the Contractor all o b l i g a t i o n s and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s that the C o n t r a c t o r , by 
these d o c u m e n t s , assumes toward the O w n e r , although the a f o r e m e n t i o n e d C o n t r a c t 
D o c u m e n t s are not attached h e r e t o , they shall become a part of this A g r e e m e n t . It 
is a s s u m e d , that the Supplier is familiar with the terms and r e q u i r e m e n t s set 
forth t h e r e i n . 
S E C T I O N 2. It is agreed that the m a t e r i a l s to be furnished FOB j o b s i t e a r e : 
As set forth in the General C o n d i t i o n s and General R e q u i r e m e n t s , D i v i s i o n 1 and 
D i v i s i o n 6, WOOD 4 P L A S T I C , Section 6 0 1 0 - L u m b e r & related items as it p e r t a i n s to 
wood trusses along with A d d e n d u m 1 of the s p e c i f i c a t i o n s and as indicated on the 
d r a w i n g s of J 0HN_ U._FME RS_A^A. Including but not limited to: 
1. All p r e f a b r i c a t e d metal plate wood trusses m a n u f a c t u r e d in an I.C.B.O. 
approved shop. 
2. Submit six (6) copies shop d r a w i n g s with registered structural engineer 
stamp to our office within two (2) w e e k s . 
FOB j o b s i t e address as f o l l o w s : 4800 South 3100 West / Roy, Utah 
SECTION 3. It is agreed that the C o n t r a c t o r shall pay to the S u p p l i e r for 
the satisfactory completion of all m a t e r i a l s furnished the sum of FORTY TWO 
T H O U S A N D ^ FJ VJ_JiWJ)J*EJ)_E_l_CH^ <LVLUL_i*lf:J. 118 • 0 0 2 i n c 1 u d T n l f T T T 
s^ate a"~ncT T o c a T sal el and" use taxes fn montFTy payments o f 9 0 $ of the m a t e r i a l s 
furnished in any preceding m o n t h , in a c c o r d a n c e with e s t i m a t e s prepared by the 
Supplier and as approved by the C o n t r a c t o r , HERM HUGHES & S O N S , INC, the a r c h i t e c t 
and O w n e r ; such payments to be made as payments are received by the C o n t r a c t o r 
from the Owner covering the monthly e s t i m a t e s of the C o n t r a c t o r , including the 
approved portion of the S u p p l i e r ' s monthly e s t i m a t e as outlined in the General 
C o n d i t i o n s of the c o n t r a c t . Final payment to be made as such payment is received 
by the Cont r a c t o r from the O w n e r . Supplier shall provide a p p r o p r i a t e lien 
releases as required by the c o n t r a c t o r . 
SECTION <•. The Supplier agrees to reimburse the C o n t r a c t o r for any and all 
liquidated damages that may be assessed against and collected from the C o n t r a c t o r 
by the O w n e r , which are a t t r i b u t a b l e to or caused by the S u p p l i e r ' s failure to 
furnish the m a t e r i a l s and perform the work required by this agreement within the 
time fixed in the manner provided for h e r e i n . The Supplier also agrees to pay to 
the C o n t r a c t o r such other or additional damages as the C o n t r a c t o r may sustain by 
reason of such delay by the S u p p l i e r . The payment of such d a m a g e s shall not 
release the Supplier from his o b l i g a t i o n to o t h e r w i s e fully perform this Supplier 
A g r e e m e n t . In the event of a di s p u t e or del a y , C o n t r a c t o r has the right to 
pro v i d e the material and adjust the contract price a c c o r d i n g l y . Supplier shall 
also pay reas o n a b l e legal fees necessary for the e n f o r c e m e n t of this a g r e e m e n t . 
SECTION 5. It 1s agreed that the Supplier shall be r e s p o n s i b l e to pr e p a r e 
and to obtain approval of all necessary shop drawings as to not cause delay in the 
progress of c o n s t r u c t i o n of the subject p r o j e c t . 
SECTION 6. It is agreed that: the Supplier shall be r e s p o n s i b l e for the 
accuracy of their shop d r a w i n g s to c o i n c i d e with the A r c h i t e c t ' s d r a w i n g s . 
SECTION 7. In lieu of retainage required by the C o n t r a c t o r , Supplier agrees 
to allow a discount of 8% ten days to the C o n t r a c t o r . 
IN W I T N E S S WHEREOF the parties h e r e t o have executed this A g r e e m e n t , the day and 
year first above w r i t t e n . 
C O N T R A C T O R : 
HERM HUGHES A ^ S O N S ^ INC. 
1650 West 5C 
*U—Bounti f utf,H*tah|/8J»0.87 
S U P P L I E R : 
OUINTEK 
P. 0. Box 76 
P r o v o , Utah 84601 
By: 
, 5ecre"£a"7y7Treasurer 
APPENDIX "C" 
Proposed Supplier Agreement 
PROPOSAL 
SUPPLIER AGREEMENT 
PIS &xfci'cit 
/f 
2?5 - / 
'.O.Box 76, Provo, Utah, 84601 
This AGREEMENT made this 22nd day of Febuary 1984 by and between 
Henri Hughes & Sons, Inc. heeinafter called the owner and Quintex Inc. 
hereinafter called the Supplier. 
Witnesseth, that the supplier and the contractor for consideration hereinafter 
named agress as follows: 
Section 1. It is agreed that the materials to be furnished FOB jobsite on the 
truck. 
As set forth in the general conditions and general requirements, Divisions 
1 and Division 6, WOOD & PLASTIC, Section 6010-lumber & related items as it 
pertains to wood trusses along with the specifications and as indicated on 
the drawings of John L. Piers AIA^ 
1. all prefabricated metal plate wood trusses manfactured in an 
I.B.C.O. approved shop. 
2. submit six (6) copies shop dreawing with a registered civil 
engineer stamp to Herm Hughes & Sons within two (2) weeks of receipt 
of supplier agreement. 
FOB JOBSITE ADDRESS AS FOLLOWS: 4800 South 3100 West Roy, Utah 
Section 2. It is agreed that the contractor shall pay to the supplier 
for the satisfoctory completion of all materials furnished the sum of Fourty 
Eight Thousand and no cents (48,000.00),tax not included FOB jobsite on the truck. 
Supplier agress to allow a discount of eight (8) percent, net ten (10) days, 
fron invoice date. The date of invoice shall be the completion date pf fabrication. 
The creation of a new supplier's agreement is made necessary for the following 
reasons: (1) Bid date was October 25,1983. Unforseen delays to both the 
contractor and all the suppliers have made accepted the bid prices untenable. 
(2) lyiaterials cost have risen dramatically from the bid date of four months ago. 
(3) Production scheduling for fabrication is becoming questionable. 
Approaching the busiest production time period of the entire year will 
necessitate increased production costs for a project which should have already 
been fabricated and delivered. 
(4) Contractor also agrees to condition of sale clause on the Quintek invoice. 
CONTRACTOR: 
By_ 
SUPPLIER: 
QUINTFK INC. 
P~J&-<& 
APPENDIX "D" 
Ruling 
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, OREM DEPARTMENT 
HERB HUGHES & SONS, INC., 
A Utah Corporation 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
QUINTEK, A Utah Corporation 
R U L I N G 
Case No. 883000004 
Plaintiff was the general contractor on a school building 
project, and defendant a manufacturer and supplier of roof trusses 
who provided plaintiff with a written cost estimate for supplying 
trusses for the project. That cost estimate contained a provision 
that it be accepted within 10 days of its date, and also contained a 
blank space for such acceptance to be endorsed therin with the date. 
The written cost estimate was never accepted by any endorsement 
theron by plaintiff or its agents. A suppliers agreement bearing 
date of November 15, 1983, appears to have been submitted to 
defendant by plaintiff sometime near the end of that month, but 
defendant found its terms unacceptable and so advised plaintiff. The 
project went forward with plaintiff believing it had a firm agreement 
for the trusses, and defendant protesting that it could not proceed 
with the ordering of materials and the manufacturing of the trusses 
until it had an acceptance of its cost estimate as submitted. It 
appears that each party persisted in its own position, with some 
exchanges between them, until February, 1984, when defendant refused 
to proceed further. This action was filed in August 1984, and has 
been languishing in the district court and then the circuit court 
ever since. 
Plaintiff•scontentions seems to be that even if no acceptance was 
endorsed on defendant's cost estimate, the ensuing conduct and course 
of dealing between the parties showed an acceptance and binding 
agreement between them. 
The written documents submitted as evidence, mostly generated 
by the plaintiff, can be viewed as supporting plaintiffs position; 
but much of the oral testimony received by the court tends to offer 
plausible explanations for the course of dealing between the 
parties. Obviously, the passage of over six years since these events 
took place causes additional problems. The one fact that comes 
through this haze is that the original cost estimate had no 
acceptance endorsed on it within the ten days required by its terms, 
and there is no document showing acceptance wVi^in$^hat period of 
time. Certainly plaintiff could^B^^asily met the conditions 
requested and avoided all the problems which have ensued. 
Viewing all of the evidence together, this court is unable to 
conclude that plaintiff has established its case by a preponderance 
thereof- Accordingly, the court concludes that plaintiffs claim 
should be dismissed. 
Dated: September 10, 1990 ,v 
Robert J. Sumsion 
Circuit Court Judge 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Ruling ws mailed, postage prepaid, on this 14th day of September, 
1990 to the following parties. 
E. Nordell Weeks, Esq, Attorney for the Plaintiff, 320 Kearns 
Building, 136 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
David Lambert, Attorney for the Defense, P O BOX 778, Provo, UT 
84603 
Kristine Christianson 
Circuit Court Clerk 
APPENDIX MEM 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
D, DAVID LAMBERT (1872), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, OREM DEPARTMENT 
HERM HUGHES & SONS, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. 
QUINTEK, a Utah corporation, Civil No. 883000004 
Defendant. 
The above-captioned matter came on for its regularly scheduled trial on the 13th day 
of August, 1990, before the Hon. Robert J. Sumsion, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs president, 
Glen Hughes, was present and plaintiff was represented by its counsel, E. Nordell Weeks. 
Defendant's president, Boyd Jacobson, was present and defendant was represented by its 
attorney, D. David Lambert. The Court received the evidence of the parties and has considered 
the arguments of counsel, together with the legal authorities presented, and now makes the 
following: 
Prquin-fof.lo 
Our File No. 15,669 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The plaintiff corporation is a general contractor doing business within the 
State of Utah. 
2. The defendant is a Utah corporation in the business of manufacturing roof 
trusses and other building components which are supplied as finished products without doing 
work on the job site. 
3. In late October, 1983, the defendant became aware of the possibility of bidding 
on the Midland Elementary School to be constructed in Roy, Utah. This information came 
through the Intermountain Contractor bidding service, and an agent of the defendant corporation 
reviewed the materials available through the service. Defendant prepared an estimate of its cost 
to provide roof trusses for the school in question. 
4. On October 25, 1983, defendant communicated to plaintiff by telephone a bid 
proposal which had been reduced to writing and which was mailed to plaintiff the same day that 
the verbal communication took place. 
5. Plaintiff received the defendant's written bid proposal on October 27, 1983, 
as indicated by its date stamp placed thereon. Said document was received by the Court as 
Exhibit 6. 
6. Defendant's written bid proposal, (Exhibit 6) specified that the offer was to be 
accepted within ten days and provided a space at the bottom of the written document for 
plaintiff to sign in acceptance. 
7. Plaintiff never signed the bid proposal of the defendant and did not 
communicate with defendant until late November, 1983. 
2 
8. Larry Gilson, of Oscar E. Chytraus Co., prepared and submitted to plaintiff 
a bid for the trusses which are the subject of the plaintiffs claims. After the bid openings he 
was asked by plaintiff to meet and Mr. Gilson attended a meeting at the plaintiffs office. 
During that meeting Mr. Gilson was asked by plaintiff to reduce his bid proposal. After the 
meeting, Larry Gilson contacted defendant's president, Boyd Jacobson, and advised Mr. 
Jacobson that in his opinion plaintiff was bid shopping the Quintek bid. 
9. The only written response of the plaintiff which directiy addressed the terms 
of the bid proposal was made under cover letter dated November 21, 1983, and was in the form 
of a Supplier Agreement. The cover letter and Supplier Agreement were received by the Court 
as Exhibit 11. Exhibit 20, containing the notes of Don Brown, an employee of the defendant, 
gives reason to believe that Exhibit 11 was received by the defendant on or about November 
30, 1983. 
10. Defendant refused to sign the Supplier Agreement (Exhibit 11) and shortly after 
receiving the supplier agreement, defendant's president, Boyd Jacobson, had discussions with 
Todd Walker, an employee of the plaintiff, stating his refusal to sign the Supplier Agreement. 
11. The Supplier Agreement (Exhibit 11) contains various terms which are different 
than the defendant's bid proposal (Exhibit 6), including the following terms: 
a. Specific terms concerning indemnification; 
b. Specific terms about assuming direct obligations to the owner; 
c. Language allowing the contractor to retain 10% of the purchase price 
until completion of the project; and 
d. Provisions concerning liquidated damages. 
3 
12. Certain shop drawings were done preliminary to defendant's submission of 
the bid proposal to the plaintiff. It is unclear if those same drawings were later submitted to 
plaintiff, but a drawing (Exhibit 13) was sent and discussions occurred relative to possible 
performance by defendant in fabricating the trusses in question. 
13. Defendant never began fabrication of the trusses and never produced any of 
the trusses for the school in question. 
The Court having made the above Findings of Fact, now makes and enters the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff failed to carry its burden to establish that there was an agreement 
between the parties. 
2. Plaintiffs Supplier Agreement was belated and untimely and did not create a 
contract. 
3. Plaintiffs conduct concerning the Oscar Chytraus bid was communicated to 
the defendant and made the defendant justifiably suspicious about the plaintiffs intentions. This 
fact, coupled with the failure of the plaintiff to act in a timely manner to confirm an agreement 
convinced the court that an agreement between the parties was never concluded. 
4. Defendant acted promptly and reasonably to notify the plaintiff that it rejected 
the terms proposed in the supplier agreement. 
5. No partial performance occurred in that no aspect of the final product to be 
supplied was ever fabricated, no step of fabrication, except a preliminary drawing, was ever 
commenced, plaintiff never accepted or received any goods and plaintiff paid no monies to 
defendant. 
4 
6. The supplier agreement sent to defendant by the plaintiff, in addition to being 
untimely, was materially different than defendant's original proposal. 
7. Defendant's efforts to pursue an agreement with the plaintiff after its offer 
expired does not constitute a waiver or otherwise convince the court that an agreement was ever 
reached. 
8. Plaintiff alleged only a cause of action for breach of contract and no estoppel 
or reliance claims were pleaded or proven. 
9. Plaintiffs claims should be dismissed with prejudice with costs to defendant. 
DATED this O day of December, 1990. x vv 
BY THE COURT: * ^ \ 
^i^^S^C^JSh. 
ROBERT^ SUASION ' '•%,., 
CIRCUIT B ^ ^ R T ^ U B ^ | . o ^ 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the 
following, postage prepaid, this / ( / day of December, 1990. 
Clark B.Fetzer, Esq. 
Howell, Fetzer & Hendrickson 
175 South Main Street 
700 Walker Center 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
5 
APPENDIX "F" 
Judgment 
F ! L E D JAN - 3 1991 
D. DAVID LAMBERT (1872), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
P:quinjud.jh 
Our File No. 15,669 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, OREM DEPARTMENT 
HERM HUGHES & SONS, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
QUINTEK, a Utah corporation, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 883000004 
The above-captioned matter came on for its regularly scheduled trial on the 13th day 
of August, 1990, before the Hon. Robert J. Sumsion, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs president, 
Glen Hughes, was present and plaintiff was represented by its counsel, E. Nordell Weeks. 
Defendant's president, Boyd Jacobson, was present and defendant was represented by its 
attorney, D. David Lambert. The Court having received the evidence of the parties, having 
considered the arguments of counsel, together with the legal authorities presented, and having 
previously made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. There was never any meeting of the minds or agreement between the parties. 
2. The plaintiffs case is dismissed with prejudice. 
3. Defendant is awarded costs in the sum of $125.60. 
DATED this o day of Becember, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
ROBERT/^' SUMSION ^ 
CIRCUTKCOURT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the 
following, postage prepaid, this ID day of December, 1990. 
Clark B. Fetzer, Esq. 
Howell, Fetzer & Hendrickson 
700 Walker Center 
175 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
tv mm 
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APPENDIX "G" 
Determinative Statutes 
953 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 70A-2-302 
70A-2-206. Offer and acceptance in formation of 
contract. 
(1) Unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by 
the language or circumstances 
(a) an offer to make a contract shall be con-
strued as inviting acceptance in any manner and 
by any medium reasonable in the circumstances; 
(b) an order or other offer to buy goods for 
prompt or current shipment shall be construed as 
inviting acceptance either by a prompt promise 
to ship or by the prompt or current shipment of 
nonconforming goods, but such a shipment of 
nonconforming goods does not constitute an ac-
ceptance if the seller seasonably notifies the 
buyer that the shipment is offered only as an 
accommodation to the buyer. 
(2) Where the beginning of a requested perfor-
mance is a reasonable mode of acceptance an offeror 
who is not notified of acceptance within a reasonable 
time may treat the offer as having lapsed before ac-
ceptance. 1965 
70A-2-207. Additional terms in acceptance or 
confirmation. 
( D A definite and seasonable expression of accep-
tance or a written confirmation which is sent within a 
reasonable time operates as an acceptance even 
though it states terms additional to or different from 
those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is ex-
pressly made conditional on assent to the additional 
or different terms. 
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as pro-
poses for addition to the contract. Between mer-
chants such terms become part of the contract unless: 
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the 
terms of the offer, 
(b) they materially alter it; or 
(c) notification of objection to them has al-
ready been given or is given within a reasonable 
time after notice of them is received. 
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the 
existence of a contract is sufficient to establish a con-
tract for sale although the writings of the parties do 
not otherwise establish a contract. In such case the 
terms of the particular contract consist of those terms 
on which the writings of the parties agree, together 
with any supplementary terms incorporated under 
any other provisions of this act. 19*5 
70A-2-208. Course of performance or practical 
construction. 
(1) Where the contract for sale involves repeated 
occasions for performance by either party with knowl-
edge of the nature of the performance and opportu-
nity for objection to it by the other, any course of 
performance accepted or acquiesced in without objec-
tion shall be relevant to determine the meaning of 
the agreement. 
(2) The express terms of the agreement and any 
such course of performance, as well as any course of 
dealing and usage of trade, shall be construed when-
ever reasonable as consistent with each other; but 
when such construction is unreasonable, express 
terms shall control course of performance and course 
of performance shall control both course of dealing 
and usage of trade (Section 70A-1-205). 
(3) Subject to the provisions of the next section on 
modification and waiver, such course of performance 
shall be relevant to show a waiver or modification of 
any term inconsistent with such course of perfor-
mance. 1945 
70A-2-209. Modification, rescission and waiver. 
(1) An agreement modifying a contract within this 
chapter needs no consideration to be binding. 
(2) A signed agreement which excludes modifica-
tion or rescission except by a signed writing cannot be 
otherwise modified or rescinded, but except as be-
tween merchants such a requirement on a form sup-
plied by the merchant must be separately signed by 
the other party. 
(3) The requirements of the statute of frauds sec-
tion of this chapter (Section 70A-2-201) must be satis-
fied if the contract as modified is within its provi-
sions. 
(4) Although an attempt at modification or rescis-
sion does not satisfy the requirements of Subsection 
(2) or (3) it can operate as a waiver. 
(5) A party who has made a waiver affecting an 
executory portion of the contract may retract the 
waiver by reasonable notification received by the 
other party that strict performance will be required of 
any term waived, unless the retraction would be 
unjust in view of a material change of position in 
reliance on the waiver. 1965 
70A-2-210. Delegation of performance — As-
signment of rights. 
( 1 ) A party may perform his duty through a dele-
gate unless otherwise agreed or unless the other 
party has a substantial interest in having his original 
promisor perform or control the acts required by the 
contract. No delegation of performance relieves the 
party delegating of any duty to perform or any liabil-
ity for breach. 
(2) Unless otherwise agreed all rights of either 
seller or buyer can be assigned except where the as-
signment would materially change the duty of the 
other party, or increase materially the burden or risk 
imposed on him by his contract, or impair materially 
his chance of obtaining return performance. A right 
to damages for breach of the whole contract or a right 
arising out of the assignor's due performance of his 
entire obligation can be assigned despite agreement 
otherwise. 
(3) Unless the circumstances indicate the contrary 
a prohibition of assignment of "the contract" is to be 
construed as barring only the delegation of (to) the 
assignee of the assignor's performance. 
(4) An assignment of "the contract" or of "all my 
rights under the contract" or an assignment in simi-
lar general terms is an assignment of rights and un-
less the language or the circumstances (as in an as-
signment of (for) security) indicate the contrary, it is 
a delegation of performance of the duties of the as-
signor and its acceptance by the assignee constitutes 
a promise by him to perform those duties. This prom-
ise is enforceable by either the assignor or the other 
party to the original contract. 
(5) The other party may treat any assignment 
which delegates performance as creating reasonable 
grounds for insecurity and may without prejudice to 
his rights against the assignor demand assurances 
from the assignee (Section 70A-2-609). 1965 
PART 3 
GENERAL OBLIGATION AND 
CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACT 
70A-2-301. General obligations of parties. 
The obligation of the seller is to transfer and de-
liver and that of the buyer is to accept and pay in 
accordance with the contract. 1965 
70A-2-302. Unconscionable contract or clause. 
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract 
70A-2-107 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 952 
those relating to the present or future sale of goods 
"Contract for sale" includes both a present sale of 
goods and a contract to sell goods at a future time A 
"sale" consists in the passing of title from the seller to 
the buyer for a price (Section 70A-2-401) A "present 
sale" means a sale which is accomplished by the mak-
ing of the contract 
(2) Goods or conduct including any part of a perfor-
mance are "conforming" or conform to the contract 
when they are in accordance with the obligations un-
der the contract 
(3) "Termination" occurs when either party pursu-
ant to a power created by agreement or law puts an 
end to the contract otherwise than for its breach On 
"termination" all obligations which are still execu-
tory on both sides are discharged but any right based 
on prior breach or performance survives 
(4) "Cancellation" occurs when either party puts 
an end to the contract for breach by the other and its 
effect is the same as that of "termination" except that 
the canceling party also retains any remedy for 
breach of the whole contract or any unperformed bal-
ance 1965 
70A-2-107. Goods to be severed from realty — 
Recording. 
( 1 ) A contract for the sale of minerals or the like 
including oil or gas) or a structure or its materials to 
>e removed from realty is a contract for the sale of 
foods within this chapter if they are to be severed by 
he seller but until severance a purported present 
ale thereof which is not effective as a transfer of an 
riterest in land is effective only as a contract to sell 
(2) A contract for the sale apart from the land of 
rowing crops or other things attached to realty and 
apable of severance without material harm thereto 
ut not described in Subsection (1) or of timber to be 
at is a contract for the sale of goods within this chap-
sr whether the subject matter is to be severed by the 
uyer or by the seller even though it forms part of the 
ealty at the time of contracting, and the parties can 
y identification effect a present sale before sever-
nce 
(3) The provisions of this section are subject to any 
urd party rights provided by the law relating to re-
Ity records, and the contract for sale may be exe-
lted and recorded as a document transferring an 
tterest jn land and shall -then constitute notice to 
urd parties of the buyer's rights under the contract 
raale 1977 
PART 2 
ORM, FORMATION AND READJUSTMENT 
OF CONTRACT 
lA-2-201. Formal requirements — Statute of 
frauds. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section a 
ntract for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or 
Dre is not enforceable by way of action or defense 
less there is some writing sufficient to indicate 
at a contract for sale has been made between the 
rties and signed by the party against whom en-
cement is sought or by his authorized agent or bro-
r A writing is not insufficient because it omits or 
correctly states a term agreed upon but the contract 
not enforceable under this paragraph beyond the 
antity of goods shown in such writing 
2) Between merchants if within a reasonable time 
vntmg in confirmation of the contract and suffi-
nt against the sender is received and the party 
receiving it has reason to know its contents, it satis-
fies the requirements of Subsection (1) against such 
party unless written notice of objection to its contents 
is given within ten days after it is received 
(3) A contract which does not satisfy the require-
ments of Subsection (1) but which is valid in other 
respects is enforceable 
(a) if the goods are to be specially manufac-
tured for the buyer and are not suitable for sale 
to others m the ordinary course of the seller's 
business and the seller, before notice of repudia-
tion is received and under circumstances which 
reasonably indicate that the goods are for the 
buyer, has made either a substantial beginning 
of their manufacture or commitments for their 
procurement, or 
(b) if the party against whom enforcement is 
sought admits in his pleading, testimony or oth-
erwise in court that a contract for sale was made, 
but the contract is not enforceable under this pro-
vision beyond the quantity of goods admitted, or 
(c) with respect to goods for which payment 
has been made and accepted or which have been 
received and accepted (Section 70A-2-606) 1965 
70A-2-202. Final written expression — Parol or 
extrinsic evidence. 
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory 
memoranda of the parties agree or which are other-
wise set forth in a writing intended by the parties as 
a final expression of their agreement with respect to 
such terms as are included therein may not be contra-
dicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a con-
temporaneous oral agreement but may be explained 
or supplemented 
(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade (Sec-
tion 70A- L-205) or by course of performance (Sec-
tion 70A-2-208), and 
(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms 
unless the court finds the writing to have been 
intended also as a complete and exclusive state-
ment of the terms of the agreement 1985 
70A-2-203. Seals inoperative. 
The affixing of a seal to a writing evidencing a 
contract for sale or an offer to buy or sell goods does 
not constitute the writing a sealed instrument and 
the law with respect to sealed instruments does not 
apply to such a contract or offer 1965 
70A-2-2O4. Formation in general. 
(1) A contract for sale of goods may be made in any 
manner sufficient to show agreement, including con-
duct by both parties which recognizes the existence of 
such a contract 
(2) An agreement sufficient to constitute a contract 
for sale may be found even though the moment of its 
making is undetermined 
(3) Even though one or more terms are left open a 
contract for sale does not fail for lndefimteness if the 
parties have intended to make a contract and there is 
a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate 
remedy 1965 
70A-2-205. Firm offers. 
An offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a 
signed writing which by its terms gives assurance 
that it will be held open is not revocable, for lack of 
consideration, during the time stated or if no time is 
stated for a reasonable time, but m no event may 
such period of irrevocability exceed three months, but 
any such term of assurance on a form supplied by the 
offeree must be separately signed by the offeror 1965 
